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«UKRAINIAN CAUSE» IN POLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT AFTER WORLD WAR I

The primary objective of this article is to comprehensively explore the evolution of the Polish political thought throughout the transformative years after World War I.

A novel analysis of the diverse perspectives within Polish political thought on the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the interwar period is provided. It highlights the spectrum of views ranging from military confrontation to political integration and emphasizes the influence of broader ideological currents such as nationalism, socialism, and liberalism. Additionally, it situates these debates within the international context of relations with Russia and Germany, offering a fresh perspective on the complexities of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the interwar period.

The methodology employed in this study involves a comprehensive review and analysis of historical documents, political writings, and secondary literature. This approach allows for a detailed examination of the ideological debates within Polish political circles and their practical implications for Polish-Ukrainian relations. The study also employs a comparative analysis to contextualize Polish political thought within broader European geopolitical dynamics.

The article investigates and clarifies the multifaceted nature of Polish political thought on the Ukrainian issue. It finds that Polish political perspectives ranged from viewing the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a direct threat to advocating for cooperation and cultural autonomy. The study elucidates how these differing viewpoints influenced Polish policies and attitudes towards Ukraine, and how they intersected with

broader ideological and geopolitical considerations. The article also underscores the critical role of international relations, particularly with Russia and Germany, in shaping these debates and policies.

By shedding light on these dynamics, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of the historical complexities of Polish-Ukrainian relations and the broader context of Eastern European political thought in the interwar period.

Keywords: Polish-Ukrainian relations, diplomacy, the Second Polish Commonwealth, interwar period, UPR, WUPR.

«УКРАЇНСЬКЕ ПИТАННЯ» В ПОЛЬСЬКІЙ ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ ДУМЦІ ПІСЛЯ ПЕРШОЇ СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ

Метою дослідження є аналіз розвитку польської політичної думки впродовж трансформаційних років після Першої світової війни.

Представлено новий аналіз різноманітних поглядів польської політичної думки на український націоналістичний рух у міжвоєнний період. Розглянуто спектр поглядів, починаючи від військового протистояння до політичної інтеграції, і підкреслено вплив ширших ідеологічних течій, таких як націоналізм, соціалізм і лібералізм. Ба більше, ці дискусії розглянуті в міжнародному контексті відносин з Росією та Німеччиною, пропонуючи новий погляд на складність польсько-українських відносин у міжвоєнний період.

Методологія дослідження передбачає всебічний огляд і аналіз історичних документів, політичних творів і додаткової літератури. Такий підхід дозволяє детально розглянути ідеологічні дискусії в польських політичних колах та їхні практичні наслідки для польсько-українських відносин. Дослідження також використовує порівняльний аналіз для контекстуалізації польської політичної думки в рамках ширшої європейської геополітичної динаміки.

У статті досліджено та з'ясовано багатоплановість польської політичної думки щодо українського питання. Виявлено, що польські політичні погляди коливалися від розгляду українського націоналістичного руху як прямої загрози до відстоювання співпраці та культурної автономії. З'ясовано, як ці різні точки зору вплинули на польську політику та ставлення до України, і як вони перетиналися з ширшими ідеологічними та геополітичними міркуваннями. У статті також підкреслена критична роль міжнародних відносин, зокрема з Росією та Німеччиною, у формуванні цих дискусій і політики.

Проливаючи світло на цю динаміку, стаття сприяє глибшому розумінню історичних складнощів польсько-українських відносин і ширшого контексту східноєвропейської політичної думки міжвоєнного періоду.

Ключові слова: *польсько-українські відносини, дипломатія, Друга Річ Посполита, міжвоєнний період, УНР, ЗУНР.*

Introduction. The overthrow of the autocracy in the Romanov empire initiated a new stage in the social and political life of hundreds of thousands of Poles who had long or temporarily (mostly as refugees from the Kingdom of Poland and Galicia) lived in the territory of Ukrainian provinces. During the spring and summer of 1917, almost all Polish political camps formed legal party structures. Supporters of socialist ideas formed a network of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS; with sections of the «Left» and «Revolutionary Faction») and groups of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. The liberal environment of the intelligentsia legalized the Polish Political Union of Rus, which was soon transformed into the Polish Executive Committee of Rus (it was also called the Executive Committee of the Meeting of Polish Public Organizations of Rus). After the 3rd Congress of Polish Public Organizations of Rus, held on June 18-24, 1917 in Kyiv, failed to consolidate various political forces, two centers of opposition were formed. Some demanded the restoration of a united Poland with the help of the Entente, as well as broad autonomous rights for the «Kresian» Poles. Others were ready to accept limited but immediate statehood within the boundaries of the Polish kingdom captured by the Austro-German army and national-personal autonomy for the Polish population declared by the Ukrainian Central Council in January 1918. Ultimately, the Ministry (Secretariat) of Polish Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic was created in Kyiv, which, under the leadership of liberals, was able to unite the work of conservatives and socialists (about 80 people). In

August 1917, 20 seats in the Ukrainian Central Rada were reserved for Polish politicians. The educational needs of Poles in Kyiv alone were satisfied by 2 Polish male gymnasiums, 2 male schools, 4 female gymnasiums, one female school, a four-class mixed school, 10 primary schools, 20 orphanages and boarding schools [7, pp. 24-30; 27; 30, p. 212; 31, pp. 60-61]. At that time, not only Polish political, but also socio-cultural, economic and professional structures were active: the Kyiv Circle of Polish Writers and Journalists, the Polish Society of Art Admirers, the Polish Scientific and Legal Society, the Polish Industrial and Technical Society, the Society of Mutual Assistance in Search of Work for farmers, foresters and industrial workers «Majbutne», the Society of Mutual Aid of Polish Workers, the Union of Poles Employed in the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos, the Polish Consumer Union «Bread», the Polish Joint-Stock Company of Foreign Trade, the Local History Society of Rus, the Society for the Support of Polish Culture and Science of Rus, the Polish Scientific Society, the Society of Friends of the Polish Soldier, the Polish Military Aid League and dozens of others [13, pp. 182-230].

Evaluating the military defeat of the Central Powers and the collapse of the Brest system of international relations in Central-Eastern Europe, the founder of British geopolitics, H. Mackinder, drew attention to the role of «peripheral states» and, above all, Ukraine, in ensuring the balance of power on the continent. In 1919, on the instructions of the head of London diplomacy G. Curzon, he, as the British High Commissioner, visited Odessa and Novorossiysk, where he tried to convince the leaders of the White Guard movement (including A. Denikin) of the need to recognize the newly established national states and to persuade the former to support Poles against the expansion of the Bolsheviks [5].

Meanwhile, the disintegration processes on the territory of the former Russian Empire during the spring-autumn of 1917 became the basis for rebuilding Germany's new eastern policy, primarily in the Ukrainian issue. The leaders of the German Empire, who at the beginning of the First World War turned to the idea of limited assistance to the state-building aspirations of Ukrainians, at the turn of 1915-1916 finally realized that Ukraine could become for the Reich not just an auxiliary, but also a vital tool for winning the war. The most important prerequisite for the use of this factor was the recognition of the right of Ukrainians to create a national state. In the list of peace conditions of August 19, 1917, it was determined: in addition to recognizing the newly created state of Poland, Germany will protect the rights to the independence of Ukraine, Finland, and the Baltic provinces [21].

Sources overview. The reclamation of Ukrainian sovereignty in 1991 not only marked a pivotal moment in the nation's history but also reignited scholarly interest in its prolonged struggle for independence, particularly during the critical period of 1917-1921. This era, crucial for understanding the intricate dynamics of Ukrainian national identity and its aspirations for self-determination, also reflects the complex interplay with Polish political thought and the broader regional context of Eastern Europe. The «Ukrainian cause» – a term encapsulating Ukraine's pursuit of national sovereignty – has thus become a focal point of historical inquiry, especially against the backdrop of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the post-World War I era. Historically, the struggle for Ukrainian independence was deeply intertwined with the geopolitical and ideological landscapes of neighboring states, including Poland. The narrative of Ukrainian independence efforts, particularly during 1917–1921, was significantly influenced by Polish political thought and policies, as Poland grappled with its own re-emergence as a sovereign state and its complex relationship with Ukraine. During the Soviet era, the

champions of Ukraine's national liberation movements were harshly criticized and labeled as «Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists», a demonization that extended to Polish perspectives on Ukrainian nationalists, often portrayed within a framework of geopolitical rivalry and ethnic tensions.

In this period of ideological distortion, an objective study of the Ukrainian cause, including its interactions with Polish political thought, was virtually impossible within the Soviet Union. Research that shed light on these historical relationships was primarily undertaken by Ukrainian scholars in the diaspora and by international academics, free from the constraints of Soviet historiography. With Ukraine's independence in 1991 and the subsequent dismantling of ideological barriers, a renewed scholarly endeavor began to unfold, aimed at exploring the multifaceted struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty. This included a critical examination of Polish political thought and its influence on, and response to, the Ukrainian cause during the tumultuous years following World War I. Today, while a rich body of literature has emerged to document and analyze this period, acknowledging the strides made in uncovering the nuanced narrative of Ukrainian independence, there remains an acknowledgment that certain aspects – particularly those involving the intricate Polish-Ukrainian interactions – remain underexplored or contentious.

Purpose of the article. The primary objective of this article is to comprehensively explore the intricate dynamics of the «Ukrainian cause» within Polish political thought after World War I, shedding light on how this issue shaped and was shaped by the tumultuous interwar period in Eastern Europe. The article aims to offer an understanding of the «Ukrainian cause» in Polish political thought and its significance in the broader context of Eastern European history and international relations. By doing so, it seeks to illuminate the complexities of national identity, statehood, and interethnic relations in a

region marked by its turbulent history and ongoing political and cultural transformations.

Main part. On October 25, 1917, during a meeting of the head of the political department of the Main Military Command, General Bertenwerfer, with Chancellor Michaelis, a new plan for Germany in the East was finalized. In view of the exceptional economic potential of Ukraine, the German army should protect German industrial interests there, in addition, the separation of Dnieper Ukraine and Russia would significantly weaken it, which would give Germany land access to the Middle East through the Balkans [34]. Therefore, the military command initiated a new German policy towards Ukraine. The newly appointed chancellor agreed with it without any reservations, and therefore the way to the signing of peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Central Powers was opened. But the leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic cherished the illusory idea of peace negotiations with the participation of a socialist federal government. It should be recognized that the federalist positions of the leadership of the Central Rada and the absolute majority of its deputies were objectively conditioned by the degree of political maturity of the Ukrainian national liberation movement at the time of the victory of the February Revolution of 1917. The Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party was the most massive national political force. It significantly influenced the activities of the Central Rada. It was the one M. Hrushevsky himself joined. He decided in July 1917 that «it is necessary under the current tide to demand the restructuring of the Russian state into a federation of equal national-territorial republics with the provision of the rights of national minorities within their borders» [37, p. 119].

The conference of the oldest national political organization, the USDP (April 4–6, 1917), whose leaders dominated the General Secretariat until mid-January 1918, also

assumed that “federalization of autonomous national or regional units is the best guarantee of democratic and national and political rights of each nation or country» [32, p. 29]. It is clear that the delegates of the conference spoke in favor of supporting the slogan of federalization of the state system of republican Russia.

Only the Polish left forces – the PPS and its allies – the Polish Peasant Party and the National Independence Party continued to firmly defend the slogan of separation from Russia and the independence of their country, because they understood that there was no other chance to take advantage of the favorable international military and political situation that developed in Eastern Europe at the beginning 1918, may no longer be available for its implementation. The leaders of the mentioned political groups, who had the experience of revolutionary struggle against the tsarist autocracy, did not wait for the illusory end of the First World War, but proceeded from the accomplished fact – the defeat and the collapse of the Russian state.

Of all the domestic political associations at that time, such geopolitical vision was characteristic, unfortunately, only of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in Vienna, which, given its emigrant status, did not have a significant influence on the leadership of the Central Rada [33]. The course of events in Ukraine in the fall of 1918 - the beginning of 1919 proved that the opposing forces could not find a common language and a path to civil peace [28, p. 170]. The situation was different in Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathia.

After the end of the world war, the two neighboring nations faced a large number of different issues. The issue of self-determination of Eastern Galicia and the formation of borders was especially hotly discussed. At that time, these and other issues were resolved at the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk [19, p. 96]. A delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic under the leadership of V. Holubovych arrived at the negotiations on

December 25, 1917, and defended the position of the Ukrainian People's Republic regarding control over the territory defined in the III Universal, as well as the inclusion of Ukrainian ethnic lands, which until then were part of Austria-Hungary. They proposed to draw the borders between the Ukrainian People's Republic and Poland along the line Bilhoray – Shchebresyn – Krasnostav – Pugachev – Radin – Mezhyrechy – Pruzhany. On February 2–4, 1918, a congress of Polish independent organizations was held in Krakow with the participation of various political parties from the Kingdom of Poland and Galicia, where the formation of a Polish state from all Polish lands was approved. However, the Polish and Western Ukrainian delegations were not allowed to the peace talks [10, p. 176].

Under the pressure of Germany, Austria-Hungary undertook to give the Ukrainians not only the Kholm region and Podlasie, but also promised to divide this territory into two parts – Ukrainian and Polish [36, p. 13]. This condition was recorded in a secret protocol, which was added to the peace treaty at the time of its signing on February 9, 1918. The Brest Peace Treaty was the first international legal act that recognized the Ukrainian People's Republic as a subject of international relations, and this, without a doubt, accelerated the processes, aimed at achieving full independence and unity of the Ukrainian lands [29, pp. 322-326].

After the signing of the peace treaty in Brest, the formation of new borders between Austria-Hungary and Ukraine began, which were supposed to repeat the old borders with Russia. The Austrians did not agree to give Eastern Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia to the Ukrainian People's Republic. According to the secret protocol, some regions of Galicia and Bukovyna were to become Ukrainian provinces within Austria-Hungary, i.e. to form a crown autonomous region. The peace treaty in Brest was negatively perceived by Polish politicians: the division of Galicia, the transfer of Volyn

and Kholm regions to Ukraine was considered a «betrayal of national interests». Therefore, a certain mutual understanding in Polish-Ukrainian relations was lost [14, pp. 121-122].

It is obvious that the Kingdom of Poland, created on November 5, 1916 with the agreement of Germany and Austria-Hungary, also claimed the Kholm region, Podlasie and Volyn. Although this mini-state was subject to the German and Austrian protectorates, its formation returned Poland to a certain subjectivity in international relations. The revival of Polish statehood was supported by some Russian politicians (among them the Bolsheviks), as well as by US President Woodrow Wilson, who, in a declaration dated January 3, 1918, stated that the revived state should receive «lands inhabited by an undoubtedly Polish population», as well as it should get «free and safe access to the sea». These slogans were supported not only by politicians, but by wider sections of the population, primarily peasants and workers [24, p. 226].

The results of the Brest negotiations were approved by the Ukrainian politicians of Galicia and the population of the region. For many centuries, being under the rule of other states, Ukrainians sought reunification with Greater Ukraine.

During the days of the Ukrainian State of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, the activities of the Ministry of Polish Affairs continued. Anton Rzepetsky, a Pole, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party, was elected Minister of Finance, and in November 1918 even acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers; in this position, he signed the law on the creation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Pole J. Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz has been appointed adviser to the Ukrainian Embassy in Vienna. For a better dialogue with Poland, the opening of the General Consulate in Warsaw and the Vice-Consulate in Łódź was being prepared. In September 1918, 998 Polish primary schools (62.8 thousand students) and 7 secondary schools (7.4 thousand students) were

operating in the Ukrainian State. The Polish Higher University Collegium continued to operate in Kyiv, headed by professor of history Ludwig Janowski. True, considerable indignation among the Poles was caused by the disarmament of two Polish corps in April-June 1918, and in November by the detachments of volunteers from the activists of the Polish Military Organization, who were supposed to go to the aid of the «defenders» of Lviv. After the repeal of the Ukrainian Central Rada's law on national-personal autonomy on July 7, the Council of Ministers paralyzed the activities of Polish national self-government bodies and the aforementioned Ministry of Polish Affairs (as well as Russian and Jewish Affairs). At that time, Polish politicians weakened not only pro-Ukrainian, but also pro-German sentiments, gradually reorienting themselves to the policy of the Entente. In the fall of 1918, a mass exodus of Poles, including leaders of Polish parties, to the restored Polish state began. Therefore, the center of Polish political life was relocated for a certain time to Odesa, where the 4th Polish Division of General L. Zeligowski was stationed, which was part of the Entente landing force. Kyiv leaders of the Polish military organization moved there [11, pp. 58-66; 26, pp. 69-70; 27; 38, p. 95]. Consequently, the events of the second year of the revolution called into question the optimism that had prevailed since the spring of 1918 regarding the future of Ukrainian-Polish military-political relations.

Instead, the Polish politicians of the region believed that the power of Poland should be strengthened by Eastern Galicia, where the Drohobyt'sk-Borislavsky oil basin, a powerful woodworking complex, thousands of breweries, and a developed railway network were located.

The plans of the Entente and Polish politicians accelerated the tension in Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia, and in 1918 they reached a critical point [14, pp. 123-142; 36, p. 23]. The signing of the peace treaty in Brest became a harbinger of the

Ukrainian-Polish armed conflict, which Germany and Austria-Hungary were able to restrain for a certain time. At this moment, Polish-Ukrainian relations began to transform from an internal matter of Ukraine to an interstate one, which can be characterized by the transition from a temporary position of neutrality between the two nations to a sharp struggle for ethnic/polyethnic territories. With the passage of time and the closeness of the end of the world war, these relations became even more acute, especially when it came to the status of Eastern Galicia. The result of such aggravation was that at the end of 1918, the relations between the two peoples changed from a political struggle to an armed one, which became a new stage of coexistence (opposition) of two neighboring peoples.

After the revolutions in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, several self-proclaimed committees and governments were formed on Polish territory, which sought to obtain supreme power. On October 28, 1918, the Polish Liquidation Commission headed by V. Witos was created in Krakow, which formed the administration, military and police units and sought the reunification of Galicia with other Polish lands [3, p. 174]. On November 15, 1918, supporters of left-wing ideas created the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Lublin, along with the People's Militia. The Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, led by I. Daszynski, also had certain power attributes, which operated in Lublin, although only on November 7–11, 1918. On the same day, the Inter-Party Committee (Central Public committee), which on November 11 transformed into the Main People's Council. In border Cieszyn, on October 19, the People's Council of the Cieszyn Principality, headed by priest J. Löndzyn, announced the accession of Cieszyn Silesia to Poland, which caused protests by Czech politicians (on their side were also Ukrainian politicians from Eastern Galicia, leaders of the WUPR). At the same time, various Polish socio-political and charitable

organizations operated in Switzerland, Great Britain, France, and especially in the USA, that helped the victims of the war and promoted the idea of reviving Polish statehood. And only on November 11, 1919, on the day of the armistice in the world war, J. Piłsudski, with the support of the Polish Military Organization and certain left-wing parties, proclaimed the restoration of Poland's independence, and therefore sent appropriate appeals to foreign countries [8, pp. 103-113; 12, pp. 470-478].

The Entente countries also supported the independence of Poland, as they considered it an anti-Soviet shield in Eastern Europe, which gave the Poles the opportunity to develop expansionist plans. The precarious position of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR allowed the Polish army to launch an offensive, and at the beginning of 1919 to occupy part of Eastern Galicia, then Belarus and Lithuania. The Red Army retreated without major battles, because its main contingent was tied up in the south and east in the fight against the white movement. In April 1919, the Poles occupied Vilna, in June-July - all of Eastern Galicia [35, p. 66], in August – Minsk, and by autumn they reached Western Dvina and Berezina. This campaign was followed by a temporary lull. Shortly before these events, on June 28, 1918, R. Dmovskyi and I. Paderevskyi signed the Versailles Peace Treaty on behalf of Poland [23, p. 289].

After the First World War, several geopolitical concepts appeared in European politics regarding the creation of a «buffer zone» («sanitary border») between the West and the East. However, they differed only in the instruments of creation and the depth of cooperation between the participating states of this zone. The idea of creating a «sanitary border» with Russia probably belonged to Great Britain. Later, it was supported by Italy and France in the form of Prime Ministers V. Orlando and J. Clemenceau, respectively. In various sources, various states were included in the «sanitary border», including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania,

Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. It is clear that the Western countries considered Poland a part of such a «sanitary border». Belvedere sought to involve Ukraine and Belarus in the «sanitary border» as well. However, the leading Western states considered these territories to be sub-Russian territories.

An analysis of the works of Polish politicians and historians proves that after the First World War, two concepts of the implementation of Polish geopolitics emerged [1, pp. 4-46; 2, pp. 512-520; 16, pp. 185-186; 20, pp. 39-45]:

1. The federalist one, which was justified and supported by the center-left J. Piłsudski, appealed to the legacy of the Jagiellonian dynasty. The concept considered Poland as a federated state of the so-called «land between the seas», covering the territories to which the sovereignty of the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth extended, and envisaged an active expansion of the state to the east. According to this concept, the main factor in the historical development of Poland was the conflict between European-Latin-Catholic Poland and Asian-Orthodox Russia. To protect against Russia, Poland had to become a very strong state. The key role in maintaining the security of Poland was assigned to Ukraine, primarily to Trans-Dnieper (Eastern Galicia was to become part of Poland). The independence of Ukraine/UPR was supposed to solve the main geopolitical task of Poland – weakening the imperial ambitions of Russia.

2. The incorporation concept (sometimes interpreted as nationalist or chauvinistic), which was put forward by R. Dmowski, appealed to the legacy of the Piast dynasty. This concept provided for sovereignty over the territories of ethno-cultural superiority of Poles, where representatives of national minorities had to be gradually assimilated. The concept of the Endeks proposed the annexation of ancient German territories (West and East Prussia) to Poland and was based on the intractability of the

ancient Slavic-German conflict. Hence the need for a Polish-Russian alliance to counter German expansion. At the same time, the authors of the concept assumed the insufficiency of the forces of Warsaw, the Polish state, for the independent management of the eastern lands that were part of the First Polish Commonwealth. At the same time, R. Dmowski not only recognized the national distinction of Ukrainians, but also the need for an energetic offensive and struggle against them, as incapable of self-determination and state life. All this, in his opinion, could inevitably lead to the Ukrainian-Polish conflict.

However, the plans of the Ukrainian political and military establishment of Eastern Galicia became an obstacle to the implementation of Polish ethno-state concepts. A large part of it, which included experienced ambassadors of the Galician Regional Diet and deputies of the Vienna Parliament, until the end of the war still believed in the wisdom of the emperor and the reformation of Austria-Hungary on a federal basis, granting the region territorial autonomy. Only a small number of politicians who were influenced by the military, particularly the commanders of the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, who had undergone front-line training in the Dnieper region (UPR and the Ukrainian state), sought as soon as possible, perhaps with the use of military pressure, to prevent the Poles from being in charge and to take over state power from the Austrian administration. In the end, it happened.

The Ukrainian National Council, which was formed under the leadership of lawyer Yevhen Petrushevych in Lviv on October 18, 1918, from representatives of various Ukrainian parties and social strata, legitimately took over the power from the Austrian governor of Galicia on November 1. This did not contradict the belated imperial manifesto of October 16 on the reorganization of the monarchy into a federation in which «each nation must establish its own state on its territory.» The

October 1st Uprising, which was led by the centurion of the Legion of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen Dmytro Vitovskyi, as many participants and eyewitnesses remember, took place peacefully and bloodlessly in Lviv and most of the Eastern Galician counties (except for Przemyśl, Yaroslavl, Syanok, Drohobych and Boryslav). On November 9, the indicated provisional parliament formed a coalition government (State Secretariat) led by lawyer Kost Levytskyi, on November 13 it approved the Provisional Basic Law on the State Independence of the Ukrainian Lands of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, established the new name of the state – the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (previously - the state Ukrainian, the Western Ukrainian state – was named after the model of the Ukrainian state of Hetman P. Skoropadskyi). The new legislation provided for the activities of the local Polish and Jewish militia, the editorial offices of Polish newspapers, private Polish schools, the provision of a deputy quota (33 seats) to the WUPR Diet, and the further work of Polish officials after taking the oath of loyalty to the WUPR. The government charged the salaries of priests of all denominations. However, the expropriations of large land properties, the internment of a part of the Polish opposition, and the activity of WUPR diplomats in the international arena caused considerable dissatisfaction among the Poles. However, Ukrainian statehood was primarily hindered by the Polish-Ukrainian war (November 1918 – July 1919), which was unleashed by Polish politicians in the region and center of Poland even before the restoration of their own statehood [15, pp. 4-140; 17, pp. 93-157; 18; 22; 25, pp. 4-42; 39, pp. 6-92].

It is also important to note that after fierce political discussions at the end of October - beginning of November 1918, the Ukrainian National Rada took a course for state-council union with Great Ukraine (first with the Ukrainian State, and at the end of November - with the Ukrainian People's Republic). This was also prompted by the

foreign policy of Poland, Romania, and even the outwardly democratic Czechoslovakia, which tried to incorporate part of the western Ukrainian lands into their states. Therefore, after the «pre-accession treaty» on December 1, 1918, in Fastiv and its approval by the Ukrainian National Council on January 3, 1919, on January 22, 1922, on Sofia Maidan in Kyiv, the representatives of both republics announced the merger of the UPR and the WUPR into a single conciliar independent Ukrainian state. On the same day, it was approved by the Universal of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and on January 23, by the Labor Congress of Ukraine. However, the cathedral UPR did not acquire the features of either a unitary or a federal state but was rather a confederal association. The act of Union made it possible to strengthen the command staff of the Galician army, which bravely fought against Polish aggression, at the expense of Trans-Dnieper officers. Trans-Dnieper also sent large consignments of products, military uniforms, and weapons to Galician Ukrainians. However, the diplomats of the Council of the Ukrainian People's Republic never received official status at the Paris Peace Conference, which only once, on May 21, 1919, invited Ukrainian representatives to an official meeting where the course of the Polish-Ukrainian war was discussed [9, p. 441]. Unfortunately, the state-parliamentary process in the second half of the year was partially suspended by the secret negotiations of diplomats of the UPR Directorate with the Polish authorities (enemies of the WUPR), and the command of the Galician army with representatives of White and Red Russia (enemies of the UPR) [4; 6].

Conclusions. Poland was consistent in the implementation of the doctrines and concepts formed by the Polish political community regarding the Ukrainian issue and after the First World War declared, but did not implement, the federalist concept of the formation of a revived state. The Polish leaders did not see in the November act of

Ukrainians and the legitimate takeover of power from the Austrians, the declaration of the WUPR signs of a national liberation struggle, that is, a desire to revive their own state, like the Polish revival, even on both banks of the Zbruch. They saw in the actions of the Galician Ukrainians an anti-Polish act, which allegedly posed a threat to the territorial integrity of the newly created state and, in addition, took place, in their opinion, on ancient Polish lands. Most of the Polish political community of that period sought to prevent the revival of Ukrainian statehood in Eastern Galicia, and even more so the reunification of Ukrainian lands.

The revival of Poland at the end of the Great War, whose lands were part of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary for a long time, also took place in difficult geopolitical conditions, but much more favorable than for Ukraine. The independence movement of the Poles (both on ethnic grounds and abroad – in the countries of Western Europe and North America) was unexpectedly supported by both opposing forces in the war – the Central Powers and Russia, which in general did not prevent the formation of separate ethno-political centers of Polish statehood on their territories and approved gradual dosed sovereignization of Poland. Instead, the Entente countries and the United States considered an independent Poland, with a national army revived with their support, an important geopolitical factor in the stabilization of Eastern Europe, where the domination of Bolshevik Russia began. The official West did not recognize the sovereignty of WUPR, and therefore conducted sporadic negotiations with its diplomats unofficially.

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