

UDC 94:327(477+438) «1918/1939»**PYLYPENKO Liliia,**

PhD, senior researcher of the department of
library and information technologies
and scientific document processing,
National Scientific Agricultural Library of the
National Academy of Agricultural Sciences of
Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine)

lilichka.pylypenko@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6408-048X>

UKRAINIAN CONTEXT IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY (1919–1920): GEOPOLITICAL, INTERSTATE AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS

The primary objective of this article is to investigate the Ukrainian context within Polish foreign policy during the immediate post-World War I years, with a particular focus on the period 1919–1920. The intertwined processes of state-building, territorial negotiations, and military alliances between the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) and the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that shaped the geopolitical and security landscape of Eastern Europe, are examined.

A novel analysis is provided of the multifaceted diplomatic and military interactions that defined Polish-Ukrainian relations during this turbulent era. The article highlights the spectrum of approaches – from proposals for territorial concessions in exchange for military support to staunch resistance against compromising Ukrainian sovereignty – and emphasizes how divergent positions within both Ukrainian and Polish political circles influenced the negotiations. It also situates these debates within the broader international context, underscoring the impact of external forces such as the Entente and emerging Soviet interests.

The methodology employed in this study involves a comprehensive review and analysis of primary sources – including diplomatic correspondence, treaty documents, and contemporary political writings – as well as secondary literature that contextualizes these events. This multifaceted approach allows for a detailed examination of the shifting alliances, internal divisions, and strategic compromises that characterized the

negotiations between the UPR and Poland, and situates these developments within the larger framework of interwar Eastern European state-building.

The article investigates and clarifies the intricate nature of the Polish-Ukrainian negotiations, revealing that the process was deeply affected by conflicting visions within the Ukrainian leadership and contrasting factions in Polish politics. It finds that while some Ukrainian leaders were prepared to make significant territorial concessions in exchange for vital military support, others decried such compromises as detrimental to national integrity. Simultaneously, Polish policymakers wrestled with balancing nationalist ambitions against pragmatic security concerns, a tension further complicated by pressures from the Entente and Soviet advances.

By shedding light on these dynamics, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of the historical complexities underlying Polish-Ukrainian relations and the broader strategic and ideological currents of post-war Eastern Europe. Its insights into the interplay between military exigencies, diplomatic maneuvering, and internal political debates offer a fresh perspective on the challenges of state-building and interethnic relations during the interwar period.

Keywords: Polish-Ukrainian relations, diplomacy, the Second Polish Commonwealth, interwar period, UPR, WUPR.

УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ КОНТЕКСТ У ЗОВНІШНІЙ ПОЛІТИЦІ ПОЛЬЩІ (1919–1920 рр.): ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНИЙ, МІЖДЕРЖАВНИЙ ТА БЕЗПЕКОВИЙ ВИМІРИ

Метою дослідження є аналіз українського контексту в польській зовнішній політиці в післявоєнний період із зосередженням на 1919–1920 рр. Розглянуто взаємопов'язані процеси державотворення, територіальних переговорів та військових альянсів між Українською Народною Республікою (УНР) і Другою Річчю Посполитою, що стали визначальними чинниками формування геополітичного та безпекового ландшафту Східної Європи.

Представлено аналіз комплексних дипломатичних та військових взаємодій, які характеризували польсько-українські відносини в умовах політичної нестабільності. Робота розкриває різноманіття підходів – від пропозицій територіальних поступок в обмін на військову підтримку до категоричного заперечення компромісів, що порушували український суверенітет – та підкреслює вплив внутрішньополітичних розбіжностей в обох країнах на хід переговорного процесу. Дослідження інтегрує ці дебати у ширший міжнародний контекст, враховуючи вплив зовнішніх акторів, зокрема Антанти, та зростання радянських амбіцій.

Методологічна база роботи ґрунтується на всебічному огляді й аналізі первинних джерел (довідних документів, дипломатичного листування, договірних матеріалів та політичних текстів) у комплексі з критичним осмисленням вторинної літератури, що дозволяє контекстуалізувати події. Такий комплексний підхід сприяв детальному висвітленню мінливих альянсів, внутрішньополітичних протиріч та стратегічних компромісів, характерних для переговорного процесу між УНР та Польщею, а також їх позиціонування в рамках міжвоєнного державотворення в Східній Європі.

Здійснено ґрунтовний аналіз складної природи польсько-українських переговорів, який демонструє суттєвий вплив суперечливих концепцій серед українського керівництва та розколу в польській політиці на хід переговорного процесу. Встановлено, що, попри готовність окремих українських лідерів допускати значні територіальні поступки в обмін на критично важливу військову підтримку, інші категорично засуджували такі компроміси як загрозу національній цілісності. Одночасно польські політики опинилися перед необхідністю узгодження націоналістичних амбіцій із прагматичними завданнями забезпечення безпеки, що ускладнювалося додатковим тиском з боку Антанти та зростанням радянського впливу.

Таким чином, дослідження сприяє глибшому розумінню історичних складнощів, що лежать в основі польсько-українських відносин, а також розкриває широкі стратегічні й ідеологічні процеси у післявоєнній Східній Європі. Аналіз взаємозв'язку між військовими потребами, дипломатичним маневруванням та внутрішньополітичними дебатами відкриває нові перспективи для осмислення викликів державотворення та міжетнічних відносин у міжвоєнний період.

Ключові слова: польсько-українські відносини, дипломатія, Друга Річ Посполита, міжвоєнний період, УНР, ЗУНР.

Introduction. The state-building process in the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) and Poland took place in the same geopolitical space – post-war Europe, but in different domestic and foreign policy conditions. Like the UPR, the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to reclaim new and old borders not only by diplomatic but also by military means. At the same time, unlike the UPR and Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR), the new map was not always based on the ethnic principle, but on political expediency, the economic attractiveness of the region, and historical

«tradition». It was thanks to military actions and foreign policy actions, and the support of Paris, where the Polish National Committee operated, headed by the charismatic endek, R. Dmowski, that Greater Poland and most of Gdańsk Pomerania (1919), Silesia (1921-1922), Cieszyn (1919), and the Vilna region (1922-1923) were incorporated into Poland. In parallel, in 1918–1919, there was a fierce struggle for a new border in the east – the annexation of Lviv and Eastern Galicia, Western Volhynia and the Kholm region in general. Lviv, like Wilno, was considered an important center not only of Polish political, but also of cultural, educational, and intellectual life [1; 16, pp. 226-231; 24, pp. 30-39].

At the beginning of 1919, the united UPR was forced to regain sovereignty and the western borders not only on the anti-Polish Galician, but also on the Kholm-Volyn fronts. However, the aggression of Bolshevik, and later White Russia, forced the UPR Directory to seek a compromise with Belvedere, personally with J. Pilsudski, who knew Ukrainian realities well. Therefore, S. Petliura began to look for approaches to an understanding with the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and sought to use its army to repel Russian aggression. In February 1919, S. Petliura urgently arrived in Stanislaviv, trying to convince the Main command of the Ukrainian Galician Army (MCGA) and the leadership of the WUPR to agree at the Khodoriv negotiations with Poland through the mediation of the mission of J. Barthelemy on peace on acceptable terms, which would allow the UPR to come to an understanding with the Entente. However, Y. Petrushevych and S. Holubovych did not agree to the "surrender" of Lviv and the oil basin [19, pp. 155-162]. At this time, a certain regrouping of political forces took place in Warsaw. In particular, in February 1919, in the elections to the Constituent Sejm, the pro-Endecja forces received a relative majority of votes, which allowed them to limit the duties of the Head of State J. Pilsudski and Prime Minister J. Moraczewski

by parliamentary means. Let us recall that it was the Endecja (national democrats) led by R. Dmowski who considered Ukrainians immature for independent statehood. They advocated the creation of a mono-national state, which would also include Eastern Galicia (up to the Zbruch and Smotrych rivers), Western Volhynia (up to the Sluch and Horyn rivers), and the Kholm region. These demands were shared by the peasant party «Piast». In return, the idea of creating a Polish federation with the UPR, BPR, and Lithuania liberated from Russian rule, which was supposed to create a protective anti-Russian «corridor» for Poland, was again somewhat pushed aside. This federalist concept of J. Pilsudski was shared by the left forces – the socialists (PPS) and the Polish People's Party «Liberation», who sought a peaceful settlement of the Polish-Ukrainian armed conflict with the incorporation of Lviv and the Kholm region into Poland, and also advocated for the national and cultural autonomy of the Poles in the UPR. The conservative minority, which consisted of large landowners of the «Kres», advocated the restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the borders of 1772. As we can see, the prospects for reaching a compromise with the WUPR were illusory, but not without result. It is obvious that the outcome was to be decided by force – the force of arms and politics, the authority and charisma of the leaders of the states.

Sources overview. Ukraine's reclaiming of its sovereignty in 1991 not only represented a defining moment in the nation's history but also rekindled academic interest in its long struggle for independence – especially during the critical years of 1919–1921. This period is essential for understanding the complex dynamics of Ukrainian national identity and its pursuit of self-determination, while also highlighting the intricate interplay with Polish political ideology within the broader Eastern European context. As a result, the «Ukrainian context» – a term that encapsulates Ukraine's quest

for national sovereignty – has become a central subject of historical study, particularly when examined alongside Polish-Ukrainian relations in the aftermath of World War I.

Historically, Ukraine's fight for independence was deeply interwoven with the geopolitical and ideological climates of its neighboring countries, including Poland. The narrative of Ukraine's independence efforts during 1919-1921 was notably shaped by Polish political ideas and policies, as Poland itself was in the process of reasserting its sovereignty and navigating a complex relationship with Ukraine. Under Soviet rule, proponents of Ukraine's national liberation were severely criticized and branded as «Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists» – a derogatory label that also influenced Polish perspectives on Ukrainian nationalists, often framing them within a context of geopolitical rivalry and ethnic tensions.

During this era of ideological distortion, conducting an unbiased study of the Ukrainian context and its interactions with Polish political thought was nearly impossible within the Soviet Union. Consequently, research illuminating these historical relationships was mainly pursued by Ukrainian scholars in the diaspora and by international academics who were not restricted by Soviet historiographical constraints. Following Ukraine's independence in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of ideological barriers, a renewed wave of scholarly inquiry emerged to explore the multifaceted struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty. This research has involved a critical examination of Polish political thought and its influence on – and reaction to – the Ukrainian cause during the turbulent post-World War I period.

Today, although a substantial body of literature has developed that documents and analyzes this era – acknowledging significant progress in uncovering the nuanced history of Ukrainian independence – there is still recognition that certain aspects,

particularly those concerning the complex interactions between Poland and Ukraine, remain underexplored or contentious.

Purpose of the article. The primary objective of this article is to investigate the Ukrainian context within Polish foreign policy during 1919-1920, with a focus on its geopolitical, interstate, and security dimensions. It seeks to analyze how the Ukrainian issue influenced Polish diplomatic strategies and national security considerations in the aftermath of World War I, while also examining its broader implications for Eastern European international relations. In doing so, the article aims to clarify the interplay between national identity, statehood, and interethnic relations amid the complex and turbulent political landscape of the interwar period.

Main part. One of the first attempts of the UPR leadership to regulate relations with Poland was the sending of a diplomatic delegation consisting of two diplomats – O. Karpynsky and V. Prokopovych – to Warsaw on December 31, 1918. However, during the Ukrainian-Polish conflict, when the UPR and the WUPR proclaimed the Act of Union, Polish politicians refused to engage in dialogue with Ukrainian diplomats, who returned to Kyiv at the end of January 1919. The next mission was sent by the UPR Foreign Minister K. Matsievych, who conducted an active dialogue with representatives of the Entente countries, appointing Colonel B. Kurdynovsky as its head. In addition, K. Matsievych held negotiations with B. Kutylowski, who was the representative of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under the Entente command. During their conversation, it became clear that Poland would sign peace with the UPR only on the condition that it withdraw its troops from Galicia and stop covering the flanks of the WUPR troops, since at that time the UPR army was covering the northern wing of the UGA on the Kholm Front.

UPR diplomats were faced with a difficult choice, which forced them to seek compromises and make unpopular agreements. Therefore, on May 24, 1919, the UPR mission headed by B. Kurdynovsky agreed to a military-political alliance on terms favorable to Warsaw: for its part, the UPR had to abandon its claims to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia up to the Styr River, and then Poland promised to provide assistance to the UPR Army, which was to be subordinate to the General Staff of the Polish Army in the fight against the Bolsheviks. The agreement stated: recognition of the independence of the UPR would occur after its liberation with the help of Poland and the formation of a new government; an additional clause stipulated that the foreign policy activities of UPR diplomats would be coordinated with Warsaw [12, p. 83]. It should be noted that even Polish historians noted the inequality of this treaty, which could have led to Ukraine eventually becoming a Polish satellite [4, p. 94].

However, the results of B. Kurdynovsky's May negotiations in Warsaw contradicted the Act of Unity of January 22, 1919. In addition, the Polish delegation in Paris used his statements as a tool to influence the decision of the Supreme Council on the problem of Galicia, as the Poles quickly sent a telegram about a possible agreement between the UPR and the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and their alliance in the fight against the Bolsheviks to D. Lloyd George, which was read out at the Council meeting. However, in a difficult situation, when the Red Army pushed the UPR troops to Kamianets-Podilskyi, the 50,000-strong GA, which retreated to the Kamianets area, could save the UPR. Therefore, S. Petliura was forced to annul the results of the negotiations and dismiss B. Kurdynovsky from the post of ambassador for exceeding his powers [3, pp. 18-20].

It is clear that in Ukraine there were many opponents of the orientation towards Poland. For example, the president of the People's Council of the WUPR and a member

of the UPR Directory (since January 1919) Y. Petrushevych gathered around him a group of Galicians and Dnieper residents who refused to support any territorial concessions by Poland. On the other hand, the diplomatic representative of the WUPR in Vienna, and later the UPR ambassador to Switzerland, M. Vasylo, believed that in order to preserve statehood it was necessary to seek compromises. [33, p. 13].

While the WUPR existed and the Polish-Ukrainian war was ongoing, Ukrainian-Polish relations had no prospects. However, a glimmer of hope in the dialogue appeared when the GA retreated to the left bank of the Zbruch, and the Peace Conference in Paris on June 25, 1919 announced the transfer of Eastern Galicia to Poland. At that time, J. Pilsudski was interested in having a buffer between Poland and Bolshevik Russia, so he was not against a constructive dialogue with the UPR. [2, p. 302].

On July 23, 1919, S. Petliura sent a new diplomatic mission to Warsaw, headed by Colonel of the General Staff P. Lipko, with the aim of stopping hostilities on the Polish-Ukrainian front. In addition, he sent a letter to representatives of the Entente countries, in which he asked to provide protection to the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia after the occupation by the Poles [35, p. 4]. Therefore, another Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission was sent to Poland, headed by P. Pylypchuk, to discuss the issue of borders and the signing of a peace declaration on August 19–21 [3, pp. 70-81]. And already on August 19, P. Pylypchuk declared that Ukraine would recognize Poland's proposal regarding the border, which was proposed by the Paris Peace Conference. At the same time, he informed the Polish press that the negotiations had finally resolved the issue of Eastern Galicia; moreover, not only the UPR leadership, but the entire people were seeking improved relations with Poland. The armistice with the Poles was signed on September 1, which allowed the UPR to eliminate one of the fronts and strengthen the other fronts – the anti-Soviet and anti-Denikin fronts. The UPR diplomacy agreed to

Poland's main condition – recognition of the border along the Zbruch River. The indicated actions of the UPR diplomats caused indignation of the leadership of the WPUR, and most importantly - the soldiers of the GA, so S. Petliura again had to qualify the agreement with Poland, signed by P. Pylypchuk, as an excess of authority [27, p. 11; 34, p. 17].

On September 26, at a joint meeting of the governments of the UPR and the WUPR, a decision was made to send a new diplomatic mission to Poland, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Livytsky; the representative of the WUPR, S. Vytvytsky, was approved as his second deputy. In addition, the Instructions were approved, which all members of the delegation were to strictly adhere to. Its main task was to achieve understanding between Ukraine and Poland and sign a treaty on a bilateral alliance that would allow them to repel the Bolsheviks and Denikinists. The renewed diplomatic mission of the UPR initially numbered 38 people, and later its composition was expanded to 97 (4 political advisers, 5 expert advisers, including military, 6 secretaries, etc.) [5, p. 514; 22, pp. 225-228; 30, p. 64]. On October 4, 1919, the delegation left Husiatyn for the Polish capital and began its work on October 9 [8, pp. 21-22; 15, p. 88]. It should be noted that the Polish leaders welcomed the arrival of Ukrainian diplomats, who, having no official premises, settled in hotels [28].

Head of State J. Pilsudski, during a meeting on November 3 with A. Livytsky, expressed hope for the success of new negotiations. But another dialogue with the Poles turned out to be difficult again. The issue of borders caused the greatest controversy: Polish politicians refused to return to the Ukrainians the «historically Polish» lands of Eastern Galicia captured during the war of 1918–1919 and rejected the ethnographic principle of dividing the territories proposed by the Ukrainians. However, the possibility of «ceding the Kholmshchyna and Podlasie» was allowed (conditionally before the

convening of the Ukrainian Parliament). Interestingly, the expert on the borders of the UPR was the historian I. Krypiakevych, who participated in some meetings of the diplomatic mission. At the same time, at the mentioned meeting J. Pilsudski stated that «Poland is not independent in its foreign policy and therefore cannot manifest its recognition of Ukraine earlier than the Entente powers do so.» [3, pp. 135,168,172; 13, pp. 286-287].

In the autumn of 1919, there were almost no prominent politicians left in the UPR who did not understand the need to sign a political agreement with Poland. Therefore, on November 15, at a joint meeting of the Directory and the UPR government, a corresponding decision was approved. [21, pp. 354-358]. The difficult situation of the UPR Army on the Bolshevik and Denikin fronts forced Ukrainian diplomats to take a radical decision and present to Belvedere a draft agreement in which the Ukrainians agreed to territorial concessions and recognition of the border along the Zbruch River. In return, they proposed that Warsaw grant equal rights to Western Ukrainians and provide them with opportunities for the development of national culture. The specified «conditions» of the draft agreement forced the Galician S. Vytvytskyi to leave the mission, because he did not agree to the «Polish formula in the case of Eastern Galicia» [3, pp. 175-177].

On December 2, Warsaw agreed to sign the proposed draft agreement. Representatives of the Polish delegation issued a statement in which they emphasized that Poland would provide all necessary assistance to the UPR, but due to various domestic and foreign political factors, the agreement would be signed only in April 1920. The main factor that restrained Poland's actions to recognize the UPR and sign a military-political alliance with it was the negative attitude of the Entente. [29].

In connection with the deployment of the General Staff of the UPR Army on the territory of Poland and to deepen Polish-Ukrainian relations, on December 12, 1919, the Directory ordered the creation of a military section at the diplomatic mission of A. Livytsky –to manage the transfer of prisoners of war to regular units, organize material and spiritual assistance to prisoners and internees in Poland, participate in the development of projects and the signing of military conventions between the governments of the UPR and the Polish Commonwealth, and provide military expertise at the Ukrainian diplomatic mission» [26, p. 7]. It was felt that the Entente had unofficially allowed Belvedere to resolve the Ukrainian question at its own discretion. However, there were also internal factors that hindered the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations, the main of which were contradictions in Polish politics: some government officials considered an understanding with the Bolsheviks more advantageous than assistance to the united UPR.

The diplomatic delegation of Ukrainians and A. Livytsky himself made considerable efforts to sign this agreement. The result of their fruitful work was the preparation of the agreement for signing by the heads of state by April 20, 1920. During the discussion of the project, the leaders of the UPR, Vice-Premier M. Shadlun, Minister of War General V. Salsky and some other politicians did not deny the possibility of signing the agreement with Polish amendments to the article on borders, but many politicians and government officials recognized the project as slavish for Ukraine, however, taking into account the then military-political situation, acceptable. Only representatives of the socialist parties categorically opposed the signing of this agreement, however, despite this, A. Livytsky's proposal to sign the agreement was approved on April 20 [31, p. 124].

Thus, according to the military-political union of April 22–24, 1920, Poland recognized the territory of the UPR within the Right Bank, that is, the borders with Russia until 1772, and the common border was to pass along the Zbruch River. The determination of the ownership of the part of the territory of Volhynia that went to Poland was postponed and it was proposed to create a special commission for this purpose. In addition, for its part, Poland undertook not to sign international agreements directed against the UPR, and the government of the latter - respectively, against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; both governments declared the need to ensure the national and cultural needs of national minorities. The agreement entered into force immediately after its signing [17, pp. 5-7].

After signing the military-political treaty with the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, S. Petliura addressed the Ukrainian people, where he noted that for more than three years the Ukrainian people had been fighting for their independence, without any support from outside, and no country in the world, except Poland, had recognized the independence of the UPR. Let us not forget that S. Petliura failed to raise a nationwide anti-Bolshevik uprising.

However, members of the socialist parties of Ukraine (USDRP, UPSR, Bund, etc.) who rallied around the government of I. Mazepa opposed the Warsaw Pact. Protesting against the treaty with Poland, the head of the UPR government I. Mazepa resigned in May 1920, and later he noted that the Polish-Ukrainian treaty caused great discontent among the Ukrainian state center in exile, among the Ukrainian emigration, society, and especially among Galician Ukrainians. These accusations were mainly directed at S. Petliura. Other leading Ukrainian politicians, in particular M. Hrushevsky, V. Vynnychenko, and M. Shapoval, also considered the signing of the treaty with the

Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to be a betrayal of the interests of united Ukraine [14, p. 266].

In the Polish state, the signing of the Warsaw Pact also caused indignation among influential politicians, which led to sharp criticism from the Endecja and their allies, who held a different opinion regarding Ukraine and believed that it was more profitable for Poland to develop diplomatic relations with Russia. This position was openly voiced by J. Pilsudski at a meeting with A. Livytsky, but the favorable attitude towards the UPR, which he also openly expressed, ultimately led to the signing of the treaty. Although the Polish side did not always adhere to its terms [20, pp. 366-377].

The Entente countries, especially Great Britain, were generally against the Polish-Russian war and on February 28, 1920 warned Poland: in the event of aggression against Russia, they could stop providing it with any assistance, but J. Pilsudski was not very concerned about this, in addition, he made a lot of efforts to support S. Petliura, help the UPR in obtaining international recognition, and re-equip the 20,000-strong Dnieper Army [7, pp. 218-219; 11, pp. 344-382; 14, pp. 256-264; 23, pp. 294-341].

After the Red Army's victory over General A. Denikin's troops in the spring of 1920, Russia concentrated its military efforts in the west, so on the instructions of V. Lenin, significant military forces were redeployed in the direction of Ukraine and Belarus. However, the Polish-Ukrainian troops were ahead of the Bolshevik army and launched an offensive on April 25, 1920. The 3rd and 4th armies operated on the front from Pripyat to the Dniester, which initially included the 3rd and 6th Ukrainian divisions, and were later joined by the 1st Zaporizhzhia, 2nd Volyn, 4th Kyiv and 5th Kherson rifle divisions of the UPR, led by General M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko. The combined Polish-Ukrainian army had 143,500 soldiers against 65,300 fighters of the Bolshevik army, which allowed the Allies to briefly occupy Kyiv. In addition, Ukrainian

rebel formations were actively operating in the rear of the Red Army, and there was also an anti-Bolshevik mutiny of two brigades of the former Red Ukrainian Galician Army, which were transferred to the Polish front and transferred to the Polish-Ukrainian army [6, pp. 24-48; 25, pp. 102-103].

However, under pressure from the Entente, on July 10, 1920, Poland agreed to a temporary armistice with Russia and a border with the RSFSR, which would run along the so-called Curzon Line. However, the Russian-Polish negotiations were not in the latter's favor because the Soviet delegation, blinded by victories on several fronts, ignored their proposals, since the Red Cossacks had achieved certain successes and the situation created more favorable positions for them in peace negotiations. In the end, the Russian command, namely M. Tukhachevsky, S. Budyonny and K. Voroshilov, did not want to stop there - they sought to capture Lviv and Warsaw.

On August 14–17, 1920, a turning point occurred at the front as a result of the defeat of M. Tukhachevsky's army during the Battle of Warsaw, which led to the retreat of the Red Army to the east under the blows of Polish-Ukrainian troops. The First Cavalry Army failed to take Lviv (August 17–19) and Zamość (August 17–31), which opened the way to Warsaw and other European capitals [10, pp. 126-131]. This led to the activation of Russian diplomats and a new round of Polish-Soviet negotiations, during which Russia offered Poland new conditions, namely the annulment of the treaty with the UPR. But Soviet diplomats did not take into account the situation at the front, when the Red Army was retreating to the east, so at the new negotiations on the armistice in September-October, J. Pilsudski could continue the offensive and dictate the terms of the armistice. However, influential political figures strongly advocated reconciliation with Russia, so on October 12, 1920, a peace treaty was signed in Riga, according to the points of which hostilities ceased, the border line in Ukraine was

determined: Sarny – Rivne – Radyviliv – Zbruch River. In addition, the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth undertook to cease any support for the armies of the UPR and P. Wrangel. This agreement came into force on October 19.

Following Y. Petrushevych, S. Petliura also sent a diplomatic delegation of the UPR to Riga, headed by S. Shelukhyn and V. Kedrovsky. He expected that the Polish side would support its participation in the negotiations, but the head of the Polish delegation reported: Warsaw had already recognized the Soviet government of Ukraine and its delegation, therefore, the UPR delegation was not allowed to attend the Riga negotiations, and Ukraine would be represented by a delegation of the Ukrainian SSR headed by K. Rakovsky. S. Petliura sent a note of protest to Warsaw, because he considered this a gross violation of Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty, which stated that Poland had no right to conduct negotiations concerning Ukraine without its direct participation. The UPR government considered the negotiations with Russia behind its back to be a betrayal on the part of Poland [32, p. 69]. On the other hand, Y. Petrushevych did not approve of the actions of all the negotiators. At the same time, the diplomats of the WUPR managed to meet several times with representatives of the Ukrainian SSR and the Galician SSR and find out their pro-Soviet plans. [9, pp. 346-350; 18, pp. 322-328].

Conclusions. The military-political situation in Central and Eastern Europe directly affected the quality of the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations. The lack of a clear plan for the future development of the UPR, the inconsistency of the statesmanlike positions of the leadership of the UPR and the WUPR (primarily represented by S. Petliura and Y. Petrushevych), the Entente states' rejection of the Ukrainian leadership as independent in governing the country, the territorial claims of neighboring states led to a delay, and in some cases, the termination of the dialogue between Poland

and the UPR. 1919 became a year of unrealizable intentions of both parties to the negotiation process. However, if the UPR Directory lost its territories, the Polish state extended its system of power to these lands. The military occupation of Eastern Galicia and its «legitimization» by the Paris Conference forced the WUPR government to go into exile in Vienna. The multi-vector nature of the foreign policy actions of the PNR Directory and the exile government of the WUPR/Galician Republic actually suspended, but did not eliminate, the unification process.

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